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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
R. P. Gremel*
A Single Circumstantial Fact Held Sufficient to Support Conviction-L
Stoppelli v. United States, 183 F: (2d) 391 (9th Cir. 1950), the defendant
had been found guilty of having heroin in his possession. There was no
direct evidence of the crime, the prosecution resting its case on the fact that
one of the envelopes which contained the heroin bore the defendant's finger-
print. A fingerprint expert testified on the behalf of the government to the
effect that the fingerprint was placed on the envelope at a time when it con-
tained a powdery substance. Heroin being a powder, the inference was that
the defendant handled the envelope while it contained the narcotic. The
defendant appealed from conviction on the ground that this fingerprint evi-
dence, by itself, was not sufficient to support the verdict. The Federal Court
of Appeals, however, affirmed, stating that the evidence was sufficient to
support the conviction, and quoted with approval the following statement of
the trial judge in ruling on a motion for a new trial: ". . . if at the time the
defendant had it (the envelope) in his possession there was a powdery sub-
stance in it, and when captured by the officers it had a powdery substance,
which consisted of heroin, isn't it rational to draw the inference that at the
time the defendant had it in his possession it had heroin in it." In a vigorous
dissent Chief Judge Denman argued that it was the duty of the court to deter-
mine whether the circumstantial evidence upon which conviction was based
did not warrant the inference of innocence as well as guilt, and that if either
inference were possible, the conviction should be set aside. Taking issue with
the majority's conclusion that any inference of innocence would require
flights of imagination, the dissenting justice pointed out that although the
expert witness for the government was of the opinion that the envelope con-
tained a powdery substance when the print was made, due to the concavity
of the print, the witness did not state that a concave print of this type could
not have been caused in another manner. Stating that such a print could
possibly have been obtained while the envelope was empty, the Chief Judge
was of the opinion that the inference of innocence was just as strong as that
of guilt, and hence the conviction should be set aside.
Application of the Upshaw Rule to Confession Secured Prior to Arraign-
ment- In Patterson v. U. S., 183 F. 2d 687 (5th Cir. 1950), the defendant was
taken into custody at about 11:15 A. I. and, after being informed of his
right to remain silent, he signed a written confession. He was arraigned
about 2:00 P. M. Testimony as to the period of time which elapsed between
the arrival at police headquarters and the confession ranged from 30 minutes
to 2 hours. The defendant claimed that his confession was inadmissible on
the basis of the doctrine set forth in Mclabb v. U.S. (318 U.S. 332), and ex-
pounded in Upslhaw v. U.S. (335 U.S. 410). The rule laid down in these cases
would render inadmissible any confession secured after the time had elapsed
during which the accused should be arraigned as required in Rule 5 (a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This rule provides: "An officer mak-
ing an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint .. .shall take the
arrested person withouf unnecessary delay before the nearest available com-
missioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons
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charged with offenses against the laws of the United States." Examining the
record, the court was not willing to conclude that the "unnecessary delay"
rule of the Upshaw case was violated, stating that there was no testimony to
the effect that a magistrate was available before the confession was made, nor
did the record disclose any other reason for the delay. The court concluded
with the statement that once the prosecution has made a prima facie showing
that the confession was voluntary, the defendant must carry the burden of
proving that Rule 5 (a) was violated, which was not done in this case. For a
full discussion of the "unnecessary delay" problem in connection with Rule
5 (a). see Inbau, The Confessiov Dilemma in the lmvted States Supreme Court
(1948). 43 Ill. L.R. 442, and a later article by the same author, Legal Pitfalls
to Avoid in Criminal Interrogations, Vol. 40, page 211, of this Journal.)
Weapon Under the Front Seat of Automobile as a Violation of Concealed
Weapon Statute-An application of the concealed weapon statute to an inter-
esting set of facts appeared in the recent Illinois ease of People v. Liss, 94
N.E. (2d) 320 (I1., Ie50). The defendant was found guilty of violating
Sec. 4 of the act relating to deadly weapons (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, chap. 38,
par. 155) which provides: "No person shall carry concealed on or about his
person a pistol, revolver or other firearm.- The evidence showed that the
defendant had driven his automobile through a red light and was curbed by
a member of the Chicago Police force. The officer searched the car and found
an automatic pistol beneath the front seat of the caL "at about the middle
thereof, six inches back -under the seat." The evidence showed that the distance
between the floor board and the bottom of the seat was some three inches. In
reversing the verdict of the lower court the Illinois Supreme Court stressed
the fact that the evidence failed to show that the defendant could reach the
pistol without materially altering his position. "We think a reasonable con-
struction of this statute ... is that there must be concealment of the weapon,
and it must be on or about the person: and it must be so placed that it may
be used without appreciable change in the position of the owner. It requires
no great wisdom to know it is impossible to reach a pistol under a front seat
of a car without changing position at the wheel, and it is also necessary to
bend forward to reach under the seat." Mr. Justice Daily, dissenting, agreed
with the majority's construction of the statute, but contended that the court
had adopted an "extreme test- as to what was necessary to constitute a mate-
rial change in position. "In the present ease the facts established by the
arresting officer, when coupled with common knowledge, show that the defend-
ant could have easily maintained his sitting position, kept one hand on the
wheel, his eyes on the road and have secured the gun merely by leaning for-
ward and reaching down with his other hand.... Reaching for any concealed
weapon will entail some change of position, and to limit that movement to the
narrow confines set forth by the majority, is to render the statute nugatory
as to weapons found 'about' the person of an accused."
(For abstracts of other recet criminal cases turn to page 456.)
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